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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the association between the level of voluntary disclosure
and cost of equity capital (COEC).
Design/methodology/approach – Two disclosure indices following Botosan and Hail are
developed and applied in an OLS regression on 95 listed companies from Austria, Germany,
Sweden, and Denmark; the indices are deﬁned according to the temporal context (historical,
forward-oriented) of information provided in annual reports.
Findings – An expected negative relationship is found between the level of forward-oriented
information and COEC, and an unexpected positive relationship is found between the level of historical
information and COEC.
Research limitations/implications – The sample is restricted to 95 listed companies in 2005. The
disclosure index and COEC are not directly observable, and thus rely on constructs. Methodological
drawbacks might include an endogeneity bias as well as investors not having homogeneous
expectations and knowledge about capital markets.
Practical implications – Traditional ﬁnancial reporting models might not provide enough
information in order to reduce information asymmetry and COEC. The ﬁndings provide insight into
the impact of a required increased level of additional corporate information on corporate metrics,
especially to standard setters and academic researchers as well as practitioners.
Originality/value – The current research contributes in three ways: the application of a disclosure
index on an international sample; the employment of a new approach to computing COEC, explicitly
matching input variables to a pre-speciﬁed estimation date; and the provision of evidence on the
different impact of the temporal context of voluntarily disclosed information.
Keywords Intellectual capital, Disclosure, Equity capital
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Voluntary disclosure of decision-useful corporate information is considered to be the
ﬁrst step in solving the alleged problems of traditional ﬁnancial reporting (Leadbetter,
2000). Its objectives are well deﬁned: closing (or narrowing) the gap between a
company’s potential intrinsic market value and its current market value (Ruhwedel
and Schultze, 2002; Schultze, 2004). The beneﬁts of voluntary disclosure are as follows:
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DOI 10.1108/14691930710830765. it deals with the shortcomings of capital-market oriented traditional ﬁnancial
reporting (including better share pricing); and
. it provides less volatility, less insider trading, and decreases in the cost of equity
capital (COEC) (Botosan, 1997; Leadbetter, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002;
Roos et al., 2004; Andriessen, 2004; Riegler and Kristandl, 2004).
Theoretical support comes from two directions:
(1) liquidity-based approaches (i.e. the reduction of information asymmetry
increases stock market liquidity (see, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia,
1991; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1995) and estimation risk approaches (i.e. higher
disclosure of corporate information lowers estimation risk of unknown
corporate parameters; see, for example, Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and
Loewenstein, 1988; Coles et al., 1995); and
(2) the approach espoused by Merton (1987), which states that the uneven
distribution of information increases information asymmetry, which leads to
higher disclosure levels of the uneven distribution.
Empirical evidence shows that COEC (cost of equity capital) is impacted by variations
in disclosure levels, but the inability of observing disclosure level and COEC is a direct
hindrance to disclosure-related research (Hail, 2002). Different approaches have
included utilising proxies for COEC at ﬁrst (e.g. bid-ask spreads; see Healy and Palepu,
2001; Welker, 1995), which are directly observable, but might not relate to COEC at all.
Botosan (1997) highlighted the direct relationship between COEC and disclosure level,
followed by similar studies by Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Hail (2002). However,
lacking direct observability poses a problem for COEC computation in particular,
where factor models such as CAPM and the three-factor model by Fama and French
(1992) fail to capture risk components related to disclosure (Botosan, 1997; for a general
critique, see Black, 1993; Faff, 2004).
In this study, we extend the existing body of literature on the impact of voluntary
disclosure on COEC in three ways:
(1) we apply the disclosure index on a sample of four countries (instead of the
traditional focus on one market);
(2) we apply a COEC approach that allows for the exact matching of the estimates
to a pre-speciﬁed date; and
(3) we emphasize the rising importance of context-speciﬁc voluntary disclosure
research by establishing different temporal settings of voluntarily disclosed
information and their impact on COEC.
In the course of this paper, we construct our own disclosure index VRSCORE (i.e. two
separate indices referring to either a historical or forward-oriented setting), and then
we estimate COEC using an implied approach recently developed by Daske et al. (2006).
The association between disclosure level and COEC is then tested in a multivariate
analysis, controlling for company size and sector afﬁliation of the sample companies.
The results are partly unexpected: whereas the expected negative relation between
disclosure quality and COEC is found for forward-oriented information (an increase in
the level of forward-oriented information is associated with a decrease in COEC by
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associated with an increase in COEC by approximately 0.029 percent).
Hypothesis development
The deliberations above lead to the following hypothesis:
H1. There is a negative association between COEC and the level of voluntary
disclosure.
This again is divided into two sub-hypotheses:
H1a. There is a negative association between COEC and the level of voluntary
disclosure dealing with corporate information in a historical context.
H1b. There is a negative association between COEC and the level of voluntary
disclosure dealing with corporate information in a forward-oriented context.
Methodology – the disclosure index VRSCORE
Disclosure indices have been applied in academic research since the beginning of the
1970s (see Marston and Shrives, 1991, p. 195; for proof of their extensive use, see also
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979). The ﬁrst step in developing a
disclosure index lies in the methodology of content analysis, which investigates an
information carrier such as corporate (annual) reports. Content analysis is a “research
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts [...] to the contexts of
their use” (Krippendorff, 2004), where recent disclosure literature has clearly shown its
suitability for disclosure-related questions, especially when dealing with narratives
rather than ﬁnancial statements. It becomes apparent that subjective judgement is
needed in order to interpret such information (Hail, 2002). Weighting the items in the
index is another aspect; whereas early studies have applied weighted indices (e.g. Cerf,
1961; Buzby, 1974; Buzby, 1975), later research used unweighted indices, claiming that
weights would add additional noise to the index (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Botosan, 1997; Hail,
2002; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987 applied both weighted and unweighted indices,
arriving at the same results). Since computing weights would infer the need to apply
surveys to a target group, and thus depending on their judgement of causality between
indicator and decision-usefulness, we computed VRSCORE as an unweighted index,
eliminating a further and unnecessary biased outcome.
Description of VRSCORE
The purpose of VRSCORE (see Figure 1) is to measure and rank the level of corporate
disclosure on an ordinal scale according to the score achieved. The selection of items to
be included stems from 28 different sources dealing with the importance of speciﬁed
items or list of items to users of corporate information. These contributions were either
dealing with voluntary disclosure frameworks (e.g. Schmalenbach Gesellschaft Work
Figure 1.
Components of VRSCORE
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Innovation, 2003a, b, c), disclosure indices (e.g. Botosan, 1997), management and
measurement systems with a reporting option (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1996;
Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1998; Bontis, 2003), or selected items not
represented by ﬁnancial reporting standards (e.g. Aboody and Lev, 1998; Brynjolfsson
and Yang, 1999). After aggregating the suggested items, they were allocated to three
main categories following a suggestion of the Schmalenbach Gesellschaft Work Group
on Financial Accounting (2002):
(1) capital-market based information relates to the ﬁnancial and earnings position
of a company in order to provide investors with data for their own forecasts as
well as the possibility to compare past results;
(2) information about intellectual capital and intangibles consists of a company’s
innovation capability, intangible assets, customer assets, supplier relationships,
location, human capital, investor relations, and process capital; and
(3) information about corporate strategy and performance consists of the
value-adding activities and measurements of a company (e.g. value-added
reporting performance metrics such as DCF or EVA), and the strategies and
competitive advantages of a company (e.g. strategic advantage reporting;
SWOT analyses, competitive environment; Mu ¨ller, 1998; Fischer, 2002).
The master list consisted of a total of 175 items. Within each category, we selected only
items that were employed by 14 or more of the 28 sources (i.e. the cut-off at 50 percent
within each category), resulting in 19 items as listed in Table I.
Category I: capital market based information Market capitalisation
Price-earnings ratio
Relative performance of stock
Stock return
Stockholder pattern
Category II: intellectual capital Sales of and revenues from patents, new product,
and services (innovation capital)
Qualiﬁcation of employees (human capital)
R&D expenses (innovation capital)
Portfolio of patents and similar intellectual property
rights (innovation capital)
Fluctuation (human capital)
Customer satisfaction (customer capital)
Market share (customer capital)
Training costs (human capital)
Customer retention (customer capital)
Employee satisfaction (human capital)
Listing of (relevant) brands, brand portfolio
(innovation capital)
Category III: strategy and performance Description of value drivers
Proﬁtability measures
Description of corporate strategy
Table I.
Components of
VRSCORE
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with a different time reference, thereby following recent results of studies by Beattie
et al. (2002) and Beattie and Thomson (2005).
Coding these items on a scale from 1 (qualitative, unspeciﬁed) to 4 (quantitative,
speciﬁed), VRSCORE measures disclosure level as the sum of scores earned by a
company, and is computed as follows:
VRSCOREk;n ¼
X M
m¼1
scorek;n;m; ð1Þ
where score k,n is the score for time-reference k (past, forward) referring to company n
for any indicator in VRSCORE. The scores for m reported indicators are then added up
to a sum within each time-reference. In line with Botosan (1997) and Hail (2002), a
fractional disclosure rank DRANK is computed for each temporal context by dividing
the resulting rank of a company by the number of companies within the sample, with
the lowest score being awarded rank number 1. This ensures that DRANK is
increasing in disclosure level.
The application of DRANK rather than VRSCORE is justiﬁed for the following
reasons (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002):
. It cannot be stated for sure that the absolute VRSCORE values are related to
COEC in a straight-line; such a statement would be highly doubtful. Thus, it
makes sense to replace VRSCORE by a DRANK, where the underlying scoring
model merely determines the basis for the ranking procedure.
. This triggers two debatable but necessary assumptions: there needs to be an
ordinal relation between COEC estimates and the disclosure level as depicted by
DRANK; and the differences between any two values of DRANK is not as
important as a higher disclosure rank. This allows for an easier interpretation of
the coefﬁcients on DRANK: a company achieving a higher disclosure level (with
a higher rank) is expected to show a decrease in its COEC.
. Results are less biased by the underlying scoring model, merely providing the
basis for the ranking; a rank variable is less sensitive to outliers and improves
the explanatory value of the resulting coefﬁcients.
. DRANK is the only disclosure measure so far which has been applied by two
different disclosure studies (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002); applying DRANK enables
a higher degree of comparability to previous research.
. DRANK increases in disclosure level. A company has therefore three alternatives
in order to improve its rank: disclose more information (quantity); disclose
information with a higher quality; or combine quantity and quality. This
improves a company’s rank, thus creating a strategic incentive to disclose on an
improved level.
Both indices can thus be deﬁned as follows:
. VRSCORE is an international, unweighted voluntary disclosure index, following
the value reporting structure suggested by the Schmalenbach Gesellschaft, and
is not directed toward any speciﬁc user group. Its purpose is to produce a
cross-sectional ranking with regards to disclosure quality and quantity in annual
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sub-indices, measuring voluntary disclosure level with regards to historical and
forward-oriented settings.
. DRANK is the fractional disclosure rank resulting from each VRSCORE
(historical, forward-oriented). It increases in disclosure level, and is less sensitive
to outliers. In addition, it controls for the notion that there might not be a
straight-line relationship between disclosure level and COEC.
Descriptive statistics for VRSCORE and DRANK
TableIIprovidesinformationondescriptivestatisticsofVRSCOREandDRANKforthe
full sample. From the ﬁnal sample of 95 companies, the least forthcoming provide a
disclosurelevelforinformationinahistoricalandforward-orientedcontext,respectively,
of at least 16/0, with a mean of 57/6 and a maximum disclosure level of 118/25.
Validity of VRSCORE and DRANK
Since the scoring procedure depends largely on subjective judgement and perception
by the coder (Hail, 2002), proving the validity of VRSCORE is crucial. In the absence of
multiple coders, we show its validity using Cronbach’s alpha (see, for example,
Botosan, 1997), which measures the internal consistency of the items enclosed in
VRSCORE. As a rule of thumb, its value should be greater than 0.7 as evidence of
reliable results (e.g. Bernardi, 1994). Categories I and II were within the
abovementioned range with 0.95 and 0.73, respectively. Category III posed a
problem with an alpha of only 0.232, indicating a potential invalidity in this category.
According to Streiner (2003), this must not necessarily be the case since “one must not
assume that all measures must exhibit homogeneity among the items” (Streiner, 2003);
if the items selected can depict the universe of possible items, they should be positively
correlated to each other, which is the case for category III (Streiner, 2003). Additionally,
we run the univariate and multivariate regression analysis with VRSCORE indices
excluding category III, causing R
2 to drop from 16.5 percent to 8.2 percent, indicating a
high contributory value to the whole index, and justifying the inclusion of category III.
Nevertheless, the results need to be interpreted with caution.
Dependent variable – cost of equity capital
Previous empirical evidence has added to the notion that a higher level of voluntary
disclosure does inﬂuence COEC (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail,
2002). In order to compute COEC, we apply the approach of Daske et al. (2006). As
n Minimum Maximum Mean
VRSCORE historical 95 16 118 57
DRANK historical 95 0.0105 1 0.4996
VRSCORE forward 95 0 25 6
DRANK forward 95 0.0105 1 0.4659
VRSCORE full 95 17 201 76
DRANK full 95 0.0105 1 0.5017
Table II.
Descriptives of
VRSCORE and DRANK
(sub-indices and full
index)
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deal with identifying all the risk factors with a potential inﬂuence on COEC. These
approaches might not be suitable for questions regarding disclosure issues at all.
These estimates use forecasted data instead of historical data (for ex ante
approaches, see Gebhardt et al. 2001; Reese, 2005). Putting forecasted data into
company valuation models, the implied COEC equals “the discount rate the market
applies to a ﬁrm’s expected future cash ﬂows to arrive at current stock price” (Botosan
and Plumlee, 2002), where this rate is not directly observable. These models are in
better accordance with the deﬁnition of COEC than factor models, including the
valuation purpose of a company (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Reese, 2005).
Methodology – cost of equity capital estimation
The model we apply is a residual income valuation model (RIVM), starting with a basic
dividend discount model (DDM), i.e.:
Pt ¼
X 1
t¼1
Et½dpstþt 
ð1 þ reÞ
; ð2Þ
where Et½dpstþt  is the expected dividend per share at time t, re is the return on equity
(COEC estimate), Pt is assumed to be the “best available empirical proxy for a stock’s
intrinsic value”, and the discounted expected dividends are equal to the present value
of Pt.
Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) introduced the clean-surplus relation
(CSR), wherethe book value inperiod tconsistsof the book value in the previous period
modiﬁed by the difference in earnings and dividends paid at the end of period t:
bvt ¼ bvt21 þ xt 2 dt; ð3Þ
where bvt is the book value of equity in period t, xt is the earnings for period t, and dt is
the dividends paid for period t.
Using the CSR in equation (3), the DDM can be remodelled into the
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson equation, where Pt equals the current book value of equity bt
in addition to the present value of discounted residual income (xt 2 re*bvt21), i.e. the
difference between current book and market value is explained with the present value
of residual income (Fischer, 2003), expressed as:
Pt ¼ bvpst þ
X T
t¼1
Et½xtþt 2 re*bvpstþt21 
ð1 þ reÞt þ
Et½TVT 
ð1 þ reÞT ; ð4Þ
where bvt is the book value of equity in period t, xt is the earnings for period t, and re is
the COEC.
Equation(4)representsthebasisforallRIVMforthecalculationofcostofcapital.The
approach relies on residual income and is therefore dependent on information coming
from the balance sheet and income statements rather than dividends (Fischer, 2003).
Apparently, the equation in its inﬁnite form is empirically not feasible, triggering
the need to replacing inﬁnity with a terminal value estimate after the detailed forecast
period (for an in-depth discussion, see Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). We follow the
approach suggested by Daske et al. (2006) in a modiﬁcation of Gebhardt et al. (2001),
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instead of average realized returns.
In order to solve the inﬁnity problem, the authors divide the RIVM as depicted in
equation (4) into three stages:
(1) an explicit forecast period, where detailed earnings per share forecasts for the
next ﬁve years are necessary;
(2) a fading period from period 6 to 11, where future earnings per share and future
book value per share are computed with the CSR; and
(3) the terminal value, where the present value of residual income in period 12 is
assumed to be growing with a constant growth rate – any growth after year 12
is assumed to be value neutral, assuming that no company is able to outperform
its industry peers in the long run (Daske et al., 2006; Gebhardt et al., 2001).
All the information needed stems from public sources at a speciﬁc estimation date:
Pt ¼ bvps0*ð1 þ Et½ROE1 Þ
daysð0;tÞ
365
þ
feps0
t ð1 þ reÞ
daysðt;fiscalyearend1
365 2 1
hi
*bvps0*ð1 þ Et½ROE1 Þ
daysð0;tÞ
365
ð1 þ reÞ
daysðt;fiscalyearend1Þ
365
þ
X 5
n¼2
fepst;n 2 re*Et½bvpsn21 
ð1 þ reÞ
daysðt;fiscalyearendnÞ
365
þ
X 11
n¼6
ðEt½ROEn  2 reÞ*Et½bvpsn21 
ð1 þ reÞ
daysðt;fiscalyearendnÞ
365
þ
ðEt½ROE12  2 reÞ*Et½bvps11 
re*ð1 þ reÞ
daysðt;fiscalyearend11Þ
365
;
ð5Þ
where Et[.] is the expectations operator based on information available at time t; Pt is
the price per share at estimation date t; Et[bvpsn] is the expected book value per share
for the nth full ﬁscal year after t at estimation date t; feps0
t is the adjusted forecast
earnings per share for the current ﬁscal year at estimation date t; fepst,n is the
forecasted earnings per share for the nth full ﬁscal year after estimate date t; re is the
COEC; days (t,year(n)) is the number of days between estimation date t and the nth full
ﬁscal year’s end; and ROE1 is the return on equity for period 1.
The approach of Daske et al. (2006) requires some modiﬁcations in the explicit
forecast and fading period in order to match the forecasted earnings per share and the
book value per share data in year 1 to the estimation date; we followed the
speciﬁcations as provided by Daske et al. (2006), and computed COEC estimates for the
ﬁve month ends following the ﬁscal year end and took the median for two reasons:
(1) all of the sample companies have published their annual reports by the end of
month ﬁve; and
(2) since it is assumed that information about the company leaks out before the
publication date, the full effect of the information disclosed on capital markets
should be observable in share prices within these ﬁve months – the median
controls for extreme outliers and is assumed to have incorporated any
information which might be provided in the annual report (see Table III).
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Table III.
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585Sample selection and description
The sampling procedure focused on countries within the European Union, including
listed companies from Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. These countries have
been selected as being considered at the forefront of voluntary disclosure initiatives,
providing high standards in ﬁnancial reporting, as well as an abundance of
suggestions on voluntary disclosure frameworks (Danish Ministry of Science,
Technology and Innovation, 2003a, b, c; Schmalenbach Gesellschaft Work Group on
Accounting and Reporting of Intangible Assets, 2003; Leitner, 2005). The sectors
selected for this analysis are materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer
staples, health care, and the combined sector telecommunication/information
technology (TS/IT). The ﬁnancial sector was discarded due to different accounting
rules applying for this sector only (see Stromann, 2003; Hail, 2002).
The analysis is limited to one year, including annual reports from 2004, published in
2005 (see Botosan, 1997; Fischer, 2003; Hail, 2002). This is justiﬁable since companies
keep their disclosure levels relatively constant over time (Botosan, 1997). Annual
reports were selected following the empirical results in Lang and Lundholm (1993),
who found a signiﬁcant rank-order correlation between annual reports and other
venues of corporate information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002);
however, since the correlations are not 1, the annual report might not be a powerful
enough proxy for overall corporate disclosure (Botosan, 1997). This leads to the ﬁnal
sample shown in Table IV, while Table V provides the descriptive statistics for the
COEC estimates. There were no cases with negative COEC estimates, which is in line
with the results of Daske et al. (2006).
Empirical results – univariate and multivariate results
Table VI provides Spearman correlation coefﬁcients between COEC, the disclosure
indices, and several company characteristics. In order to be valid, COEC should be
Description No. Percent
Full sample for Austria, Germany, Sweden and Denmark according
to MSCI 123 100
Shares outstanding data missing 22 1.62
Share price data missing 24 3.25
Book value missing 23 2.43
Companies without two to ﬁve future EPS estimators, two future
EPS estimators and long-term growth 211 8.94
Insolvency forecasts/negative book value of equity 21 0.81
Sample after COEC estimates 102 82.93
Eliminated outliers in multivariate regression analysis 27 5.69
Final sample 95 77.24
Table IV.
Sample after elimination
due to COEC
requirements
Descriptive statistics
n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Cost of equity capital 95 0.042 0.166 0.10069 0.022792
Table V.
Descriptive statistics for
sample ﬁrms for COEC
estimates
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586increasing in beta (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002). Although the correlations are not
signiﬁcant they are positive, as expected (see Gebhardt et al., 2001; Hail, 2002; Daske
et al., 2006). The correlation coefﬁcient of 0.061 is comparable to those derived by
Daske et al. (2006), i.e. 0.060.
Also in step with the results from Daske et al. (2006), beta shows no signiﬁcant
correlation with the other company characteristics. This might stem from both the beta
measure itself, the capital structure in the sample countries (Hail, 2002), or the
methodology of implied COEC estimates in general.
The correlation between COEC estimates and the disclosure indices show the
expected negative correlation with DRANK forward-looking; however, the positive
correlation between DRANK historical information and the COEC was unexpected
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, arrived at a comparable result). This will be addressed
again below. The signs of all other correlations (including risk premium lag) with
COEC turned out as expected.
Interpretation – H1
A multivariate analysis is necessary in order to analyse the combined inﬂuence of the
variables on COEC (Gebhardt et al., 2001):
rpi ¼ b0 þ b1DRANK_HIST þ b2DRANK_FWDi þ bLNSIZEi
þ b4 þ RPLAG þ 1i:
ð6Þ
Table VII shows the estimated coefﬁcients for the year 2005. Every model includes
adjusted R
2, F-statistics, and the standard error of residuals as well as the number of
observations after the elimination of outliers. Model 1 includes the two time-related
disclosure indices DRANK historical and DRANK forward-oriented.
DRANK forward-oriented shows a negative relationship with COEC. As the results
from Model 1 imply, a one-unit improvement in forward-oriented disclosure quality is
associated with a decrease in COEC of approximately 0.015 per cent. This effect is
mitigated in comparison to Fischer (2003), who found that an increase in disclosure
index would result in a decrease of COEC by 0.08 percent, and Hail (2002), who found a
decrease of 0.1 percent for every unit increase in his disclosure index DISC. Botosan
(1997), on the other hand, found that a one-unit increase in her DSCORE index would is
associated with a decrease in COEC of 0.28 percent.
DRANK historical conﬁrms the unexpected positive relationship with COEC found
above. A one-unit increase of DRANK historical is associated with an increase in COEC
by 0.029 percent. We ﬁnd a reversed effect of a higher disclosure level, a result also
COEC
DRANK
historical
DRANK
forward-oriented ln_size
Risk
premium lag
DRANK historical 0.206
DRANK forward-oriented 20.143 0.320
ln_size 20.088 0.271 0.167
Risk premium lag 0.215 20.048 20.205 0.020
Beta 0.061 20.020 20.025 20.019 0.381
Table VI.
Spearman correlation
coefﬁcients
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587found by Botosan and Plumlee (2002). Explanations for this result need to be searched
for outside the model, both theoretically and methodologically. One explanation might
be an interaction of historical and forward-oriented information. Forward-oriented
information consists mainly of projected information with uncertain outcomes.
Whereas the capital-market has awarded a lower cost of equity to companies with a
higher level of forward-oriented information (an ex ante bonus), it might penalise the
company when the projected outcome did not occur as reported in an earlier period.
Thus, historical information which “admits” an erroneous projection might be awarded
with a higher cost of capital, correcting for the previous beneﬁt. Another explanation
might be found in liquidity-based theory, where a higher disclosure level reducing
information asymmetry has been challenged by research. Certain circumstances yet to
be discovered might reverse the assumed effect of voluntary disclosure, namely
increase information asymmetry, resulting in higher COEC. Kim and Verrecchia (1994)
suggest that public disclosure that may have no private alternative source, and may
lead to different interpretations of a company’s performance by capital market
participants, may lead to an increase in information asymmetry (Kim and Verrecchia,
1994). Due to different information processing activities by investors, they seem to
differ in their incentives for processing public into private information. Investors who
own the ability of making their own (informed) judgements about a company’s
performance based on publicly available information in addition to the low cost of
doing so increase information asymmetry between them and those investors who are
either unable to make informed judgements or who have a higher threshold cost of
engaging in such activities.
Methodologically, Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) ﬁnd a reason for a general
empirical inconsistency in a possible endogeneity bias, where the disturbance term is
correlated with one or more independent variables in the equation. Hail (2002) and
Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) ﬁnd that within the endogeneity bias, omitted
unobservable variables may partially cause empirically inconsistent results. First, an
unobservable omitted variable might impact both sample company and the dependent
variable alike, violating the randomness of the sample (self-selection bias) (see also
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Hail (2002) attempted to control for this self-selection bias
Dependent variable: cost of equity capital
Intercept 0.108***
DRANK_hist 0.029***
DRANK_fwd 20.015*
LNSIZE 20.003**
RPLAG 0.639**
Adjusted R
2 (percent) 16.5
F 5.636
SE 0.0208
n 95
Notes: coeci ¼ b0 þ b1DRANK_HISTi þ b2DRANK_FWDi þ b3LNSIZEi þ b4RPLAGi þ 1i.
*Signiﬁcance p-value ,0.1; **signiﬁcance p-value ,0.05; *signiﬁcance p-value ,0.01
Table VII.
Linear regression of
COEC estimates on
time-related DRANKs,
company size, and risk
premium lag (Model 1)
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588by introducing disclosure level as an endogenous variable in a 2SLS regression, trying
to express disclosure level as a function of size, return, stock listing status, ﬁnancial
leverage, and audit ﬁrm size. However, Hail (2002) admits that this approach might
lead to statistically unsound estimates, with a consistently lower explanatory value in
terms of R
2 in comparison with an exogenously introduced disclosure level, a
turned-insigniﬁcant size variable, and its delimitation to large samples. In our analysis,
a self-selection bias would have only occurred when disclosure level would impact both
COEC and sample selection procedures, which seems highly unlikely here. A second
cause of endogeneity might lie in a company-speciﬁc heterogeneity (Nikolaev and Van
Lent, 2005), where company-speciﬁc characteristics might be unobservable to the
empiricist, such as managerial ability or employee skills, assumed to be approximately
constant over time. Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) suggest either panel data and
ﬁxed-effects regressions, or an instrumental variable technique. Panel data, however, is
only available in a longitudinal study. The instrumental variable is rejected by
Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) for its high vulnerability to misleading results, since the
unobservable disturbance term cannot be tested, and the required high correlation with
the explanatory variable would be difﬁcult to justify from practice. Nevertheless, the
discussion above shows that the unexpected positive relationship might be due to
unobserved omitted variables, again indicating that the results need to be taken with
caution, and within all limitations.
Table VIII recapitulates the ﬁndings for H1.
Conclusion and outlook
This study extends the existing body of literature in three ways:
(1) a disclosure index has been applied on several sample countries;
(2) an approach to COEC providing explicit matching of input variables to a
pre-speciﬁed estimation date is applied; and
(3) evidence on the importance of temporal context of voluntarily disclosed
information and its different impact on COEC is observed and provided for the
ﬁrst time, thus emphasising the importance of context-speciﬁc voluntary
disclosure research.
The ﬁndings show that the expected negative relationship between COEC and
disclosure level might not be as straightforward as initially assumed. Whereas the
expected signiﬁcant relationship between forward-oriented disclosure and COEC was
found, the results for historical information were signiﬁcantly positive.
Hypothesis Assumed relationship Actual relationship Hypotheses therefore ...
H1a Negative association
between DRANK historical
and COEC
Positive, signiﬁcant
relationship with COEC
Rejected
H1b Negative association
between DRANK
forward-oriented and COEC
Negative, signiﬁcant
relationship with COEC
Conﬁrmed
Table VIII.
Hypothesis testing
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589Thus we conclude that:
. an impact of voluntary disclosure on COEC estimates has been conﬁrmed;
. COEC is negatively associated with forward-oriented disclosure and positively
associated with historical voluntary disclosure;
. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) provide analytical evidence that disclosure focused on
different temporal contexts might represent such a situation; and
. the results might be inﬂuenced by an endogeneity bias – a subsequent
discussion has shown that there might be a mitigated self-selection bias,
indicating the possibility of omitted unobservable variables.
These results need to be regarded with caution. Both implied COEC and disclosure
level are constructs and are not directly observable; the relatively small sample size
and the focus on one year deﬁne the need for further research in order to conﬁrm the
results. Future research might apply the different temporal settings of voluntarily
disclosed information over several periods, where forward-oriented information in one
year becomes historical in the following years, which also calls for dynamic analytical
models. The explanations provided by Kim and Verrecchia (1994) hint at investors
with different expectations and knowledge about a company. In the presence of
institutional investors trading for liquidity and arbitrage, some shares might be more
liquid than others. Different COEC estimation approaches might be applied in order to
test for different outcomes depending on the approach selected; the disclosure index
might also be tested on larger samples (cross-sectional as well as inter-temporal), or
tailor-made for speciﬁc industries, allowing not only for speciﬁc indicators, but speciﬁc
indicator combinations, as well as different scoring models. The contribution of this
paper thus lies not only in showing a new setting within which voluntary disclosure
should be investigated, but also in opening new venues for future research, and
therefore taking the next step in voluntary disclosure research, especially with regards
to intellectual capital.
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